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Chechens Win First Claims in the
European Court of Human Rights in
Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia
Tarik Abdel-Monemt
In Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia,' the European Court of Human
Rights unanimously found Russia in violation of Article 2-right to life-
and Article 3-prohibition of torture-of the European Convention on
Human Rights ("the Convention") 2 for its military operations in the Repub-
lic of Chechnya. The Court also found Russia in violation of Article 13-
right to an effective remedy-by a vote of five to two. Khashiyev and
Akayeva were the first of six claims filed with the Court in early 20003
against Russia for alleged violations of the Convention in its war against
Chechen nationalists.
The plaintiffs in Khashiyev were nationals of the Russian Federation
living in Grozny. 4 In the fall of 1999, elements of the Russian army
attacked and gradually encircled Grozny in an attempt to engage Chechen
separatist forces, 5 suffering significant casualties in the process. 6 By Janu-
ary 20, 2000, after fierce fighting, the Russian military had gained control
of the city. 7 In early February of 2000, Western human rights organiza-
tions began issuing reports alleging that Russian forces had engaged in
f University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. JD/MPH (University of Iowa).
1. Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, Judgment,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (select "case-
law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink; then enter applicant number 57942/
00 in applicant number search field; then select "Search").
2. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://conven-
tions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm [hereinafter Convention for Human
Rights].
3. Khashiyev, supra note 1, c 1; Press Release, European Court of Human Rights,
Chamber Judgments in Six Applications Against Russia (Feb. 24, 2005), available at
http://press.coe.int/cp/2005/088a(2005).htm (discussing judgments in cases involving
six separate applicants' charges against Russia for violations of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights).
4. Khashiyev, supra note 1, cl 1, 10.
5. See Marina Koreneva, Russian Troops Break into Chechnya as Grozny Threatens
Deadly Reprisals, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 30, 1999 (reporting that Russian soldiers
had entered Chechen territory and suggesting that the Russian army would invade
Chechnya); Russian Tanks Pounding Grozny From Three Directions, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 18,
1999, at A1O (describing the Russian forces' encirclement and bombardment of
Grozny).
6. Russian Tanks Pounding Grozny from Three Directions, supra note 5, at A10.
7. Khashiyev, supra note 1, cl 16 (noting that Russian forces established control of
Grozny between December 27, 1999 and January 20, 2000).
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summary executions of civilians in Grozny and other areas. 8 Plaintiffs
Khashiyev and Akayeva both claimed that during this period of time, Rus-
sian soldiers tortured and killed their relatives. 9 They later appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights for relief.10 On December 19, 2002, the
Court joined their Article 2, 3, and 13 claims and admitted the case for
review. 11
According to Khashiyev, he left Grozny prior to the fighting and
returned in late January of 2000 to visit relatives who stayed in Grozny.
1 2
Upon his return, he found the dead bodies of his sister and nephew lying
outside his sister's house. 13 Khashiyev also discovered the body of
Akayeva's brother in the same location.14 All three individuals allegedly
had multiple bullet wounds and were carrying identity cards. ' 5 Khashiyev
transported the bodies to the neighboring Russian Republic of Ingushetia,
where Akayeva viewed the bodies prior to their burials. 16 Days later,
Khashiyev returned to Grozny to search for additional relatives and discov-
ered the dead bodies of his brother and another nephew, along with a
neighbor, in similar conditions. 17 He photographed the bodies and took
them back to Ingushetia, where government officials examined them before
they were buried. 18 According to a Human Rights Watch report, witnesses
allegedly last saw Khashiyev's two relatives and the neighbor in the custody
of Russian soldiers and the witnesses claimed that they saw the soldiers
beat the detainees. 19
From February to April of 2000, local government authorities in
Ingushetia certified the deaths of Khashiyev's and Akayeva's relatives. 20
The Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office, a civilian entity, opened a criminal
investigation into the "mass murder" of civilians by a Russian military unit
on May 3, 2000.21 The military prosecutor for Chechnya reviewed
Khashiyev's allegations in April but decided not to open an investigation.
2 2
However, the civilian prosecutor in Ingushetia opened a criminal case
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN KILLINGS IN STAROPROMYSLOVSKi DISTRICT OF
GROZNY, (2000) [hereinafter CIVILIAN KILLINGS], http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/rus-
sia chechnya/ (describing alleged massacres of civilians in Grozny).
9. Khashiyev, supra note 1, 1 3.
10. See id. 1 1-4.
11. Id. Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, Deci-
sion as to the Admissibility of Khashiyev and Akayeva, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 19, 2002)
(decision on admissibility), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/ (select "case-law"; then
follow "HUDOC" link; then select "Decisions"; then search for "Khashiyev v. Russia").
12. See Khashiyev, supra note 1, 11 14, 17 (noting Khashiyev's departure and return
to Grozny).
13. Id.
14. Id. 11 17.
15. Id.
16. Id. 18, 20.
17. Id. '1 24-26.
18. Id.
19. See CIVILIAN KILLINGS, supra note 8 (outlining accounts of the disappearances of
Magomet Goigov, Risvan Taimaskhanov, and Khamid Khashiyev on January 19, 2000).
20. Khashiyev, supra note 1, c 28-30.
21. Id. c 31, 48.
22. Id. l 32.
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investigating the deaths of Khashiyev's brother and second nephew. 23
Both criminal inquiries were later joined into one investigation by the
Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office in September of 2000, but the investiga-
tion did not produce any results and was closed and reopened multiple
times. 2 4 In late 2002, Khashiyev submitted a request for civil damages
from the Ministry of Finance to an Ingushetian court for the deaths of his
relatives. 25 During this period of time, another criminal investigation was
opened but it could not identify the responsible soldiers. 26 Nonetheless,
the Court awarded Khashiyev civil damages because-although the exact
perpetrators could not be identified-the court recognized that the Russian
federal forces were in firm control of that part of Grozny at the time of the
deaths, and thus concluded that the killings should be attributed to the
army.
2 7
In its review of the domestic investigations, the European Court
observed that the Russian authorities had provided only a portion of the
investigation file to the Court.28 Of the documents that the Russian
authorities did provide, the Court found the most important records to be
the decision by the Grozny civilian prosecutor to open the criminal investi-
gation and the applicants' and witnesses' testimonies as to the deaths of the
two applicants' relatives and conditions of their bodies. 29 The Court also
noted that since 2000 the criminal investigation of the deaths was trans-
ferred four times between the Grozny Town Prosecutor's Office and the
Republic of Chechnya prosecutor, it was adjourned seven times, and it was
reopened eight times.
30
Russia's sole objection to the claims brought against it was that the
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust domestic remedies 3 1 prior to suing Russia
in the European Court of Human Rights-a requirement of the Convention
for admissibility before the Court.3 2 The Russian government acknowl-
edged that the court system in Chechnya was not a viable forum to adjudi-
cate the claim since the outbreak of hostilities in 1996, but it noted that
23. Id. l 33.
24. Id. 1 37.
25. Id. 39.
26. Id.
27. Id. T1 40-41. Specifically, the court noted that the bodies were discovered hold-
ing their identity papers and since only Russian forces were permitted to conduct iden-
tity checks, it appeared they had been killed during an identity check. Id. '1 41. The
exact unit responsible for the deaths could not be established, but "all military units
were State bodies and therefore pecuniary damage should be paid by the State." Id.
28. Id. ' 46 (stating that only 88 of a listed 130 documents from the original crimi-
nal investigation file originating in Grozny were provided to the Court).
29. Id. 347-62 (outlining "[t]he most important documents" from the Russian gov-
ernment's criminal investigation file that were provided to the Court).
30. Id. 1 67-68.
31. Id. l 99.
32. See Convention for Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 35(1) ("The Court may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the
generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from
the date on which the final decision was taken.").
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civil legal remedies were still available in other republics of Russia. 3 3 In
particular, Russia pointed to the fact that Khashiyev himself had success-
fully applied for and obtained civil damages for the deaths of his relatives
by the order of a district court in the Republic of Ingushetia.
3 4
Khashiyev and Akayeva, however, argued that the Convention's obliga-
tion to exhaust domestic remedies was inapplicable because the available
government remedies were "illusory, inadequate and ineffective."'35 The
plaintiffs claimed that domestic avenues for judicial relief were negated by
the fact that the Russian government, with full knowledge that human
rights violations had been and were occurring in Chechnya, directed and
supported its military campaign there. 36 To support this claim, the plain-
tiffs asserted the existence of a pattern of impunity for: (1) violations by
Russian soldiers committed in the first Chechen war of 1994-96; (2) viola-
tions that occurred and were still occurring since the outbreak of the sec-
ond war in 1999; and (3) violations, such as abuse and torture, committed
by the police throughout Russia.3 7 Documentation from various human
rights groups, media reports, and the Council of Europe itself supported
the allegations of an ongoing impunity. 38 Additionally, although
Khashiyev had applied for and obtained civil damages for the deaths of his
relatives, the plaintiffs argued that an adequate and effective remedy had to
include a viable criminal investigation and not just the issuance of mone-
tary compensation.
3 9
The Court had not addressed the Convention's exhaustion of domestic
remedies requirement40 in its 2002 admissibility decision because it
believed that the issue was deemed too closely connected to the merits of
33. Khashiyev, supra note 1, c1 100.
34. Id. 11 103.
35. Id. l 104.
36. Id. l 105 -07 (outlining the plaintiffs' reasons why the pursuit of domestic rem-
edies would be illusory).
37. Id. 108.
38. See id. 109. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has repeat-
edly issued statements critical of Russian operations in Chechnya. See Eur. Parl. Ass.,
The Conflict in Chechnya, 2000 Sess., Res. No. 1444, '1 8 (Jan. 27, 2000) ("The Russian
Federation is thus found to be violating some of her most important obligations under
both the European Convention on Human Rights and international humanitarian law
..... ); Eur. Parl. Ass., Developments in the Russian Federation in Relation to the Situation
in Chechnya, 1996 Sess., Res. No. 1086, '1 10 (Apr. 24, 1996) ("The Assembly reminds
the Russian authorities of their commitment ... to ensure that 'those found responsible
for human rights violations will be brought to justice-notably in relation to events in
Chechnya,' and demands that documented human rights abuses.., be investigated, and
the guilty punished."); Eur. Parl. Ass., Russia's Request for Membership in the Light of the
Situation in Chechnya, 1995 Sess., Res. No. 1055, c 2 (Feb. 2, 1995) ("The Assembly thus
unreservedly condemns the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by the Rus-
sian military, in particular against the civilian population ....").
39. Khashiyev, supra note 1, '1 113-14. The applicants were interested in more than
damages as "their principal objective was to see the perpetrators brought to justice." Id.
113.
40. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 35(1) ("The Court may only
deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted ....").
Vol. 39
2006 Khashiyev & Akayeva v. Russia
the case. 4 1 Revisiting the requirement issue, the Court noted that although
domestic remedies must first be exhausted before a claim is admissible for
the Court's review, those remedies must be accessible and effective both in
theory and practice and, moreover, plaintiffs should not be obligated to
pursue domestic remedies that are inadequate. 4 2 The Court emphasized
that "the application of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies must
make due allowance for the fact that it is being applied in the context of
machinery for the protection of human rights that the Contracting States
have agreed to set up."'43 In sum, the Court must examine the exhaustion
requirement in terms of the overall context of the case and the applicant's
ability to pursue effective remedies domestically.
44
Although Khashiyev did successfully apply for and obtain monetary
compensation for the deaths of his relatives, this remedy did not seek to
identify the perpetrators of the alleged killings nor bring them to justice.
45
Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs were not required to pursue a
civil action to comply with the exhaustion of domestic remedies
requirement.
4 6
The criminal investigation opened as a result of Khashiyev and
Akayeva's complaints-which the plaintiffs had brought shortly after the
deaths of their relatives in February 2000-had yet to be resolved.
47
Accordingly, the Court noted that a review of the criminal investigation as
part of the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement was linked to the
merits of the case and should therefore be reviewed under the provisions of
the Convention that the plaintiffs invoked.
4 8
With respect to the Article 2 claim-right to life4 9 -the Court found
Russia in violation because the deaths of the plaintiffs' relatives were attrib-
utable to the state and the authorities had failed to properly investigate the
deaths after the fact.5 0 On the first count, the Court noted that the deaths,
which had occurred during government custody, gave rise to strong pre-
sumptions of fact against the government and shifted the burden of proof
to the defendant. 5 1 In addition, the Court acknowledged that proof of
wrongful deaths satisfying the "beyond reasonable doubt" threshold could
41. See Khashiyev, supra note 1, ' 115.
42. Id. 116.
43. Id. 117.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. Khashiyev, supra note 1, ccl 121-22.
47. Id. c 123.
48. Id. 124.
49. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 2(1) ("Everyone's right to life
shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the
execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this
penalty is provided by law.").
50. Khashiyev, supra note 1, cH 147, 166.
51. See id. 133:
Where the events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowl-
edge of the authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in deten-
tion, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries and death
occurring during that detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded
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be derived from "the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concor-
dant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact.' 52 Thus, the
Court found that the government was directly responsible for the alleged
deaths based on a number of factual inferences. First, Russia had only
submitted about two-thirds of the files from the criminal case opened in
February of 2000 to the Court-conduct that allowed the Court to draw
pronounced inferences against Russia. 53. Within the files that had been
turned over, the Russian investigators themselves noted numerous times
that the deaths were an unlawful "mass murder" committed by soldiers-
although none had been specifically identified-who had obtained control
of the Grozny neighborhood where the deaths occurred. The testimony of
both plaintiffs and other witnesses supported this presumption. 54 Reports
from human rights organizations further supported these accounts. 55
Finally, the civil court in Ingushetia-which had awarded Khashiyev civil
damages for the deaths of his relatives-had concluded that only the gov-
ernment forces could be responsible for the killings given the circum-
stances that existed at that time-a finding that substantiated the
conclusion that Russian forces were responsible for the deaths. 56 Taken
together, the Court held that Russian soldiers had killed the applicants'
relatives. Therefore, the deaths were attributable to the state, amounting to
a direct violation of Article 2 of the Convention.57
Moreover, the Court held that Russia had violated Article 2 of the Con-
vention by also failing to properly investigate the deaths of the plaintiffs'
relatives. The obligation to conduct effective investigations of alleged kill-
ings accomplished by force is based on a reading of Article 2 with Article 1,
which states that "[tihe High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... this Con-
vention."'58 This presumably would apply to the deaths of individuals
while in government custody. This obligation was first recognized in the
case of McCann & Others v. United Kingdom,59 and later developed in Kaya
v. Turkey.60 Both cases involved alleged extrajudicial killings of individuals
by government agents. 61
as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing
explanation.
Id.
52. Id. 134.
53. Id. 136-39.
54. Id. 91cl 141-42.
55. Id. 9 144.
56. Id. 91 145.
57. Id. 9 147.
58. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 2, arts. 1-2. Although the text in the
convention does not explicitly mention an obligation that the government conduct effec-
tive investigations, courts have interpreted that the obligation arises from a reading of
Article 2 in conjunction with Article 1. See, e.g., Khashiyev, supra note 1, 1 153.
59. McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 97, 98-99
(1996).
60. Kaya v. Turkey, App No. 22729/93, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 2, 25-28 (1998).
61. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, The European Court of Human Rights: Chechnya's Last
Chance?, 28 VT. L. REv. 237, 275-79 (2004) (outlining McCann and Kaya cases and the
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In Khashiyev, the Court noted that the payment of monetary damages
could not satisfy the obligation to conduct an Article 2 investigation fol-
lowing a death in custody. It also held that Article 2 required that the
authorities conduct an investigation capable of identifying and punishing
the perpetrator(s).6 2 In the investigation at issue, there was no attempt to
locate the whereabouts of the military unit active in Grozny at the time of
the deaths or to identify its officers or servicemen.6 3 Moreover, the govern-
ment's attempts to identify or locate other witnesses or to conduct proper
autopsies of the bodies were insufficient and inadequate.6 4 Additionally,
the criminal investigation was adjourned and reopened eight times
between May 2000 and January 2003 and transferred between prosecutors
at least four times "with no clear explanation. '6 5 For these reasons, the
Court found that Russia had violated its Article 2 obligation to effectively
investigate the deaths of the plaintiffs' relatives.
66
Khashiyev and Akayeva also claimed that Russia violated Article 3 of
the Convention-prohibition of torture-given the reported state of their
deceased relatives' corpses. 6 7 Although testimony existed alleging the exis-
tence of multiple bullet and stab wounds, there was insufficient evidence to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the decedents were tortured prior to
being killed. 68 However, like Article 2, Article 3 read together with Article
1 imposes a positive obligation upon governments to conduct effective
investigations into allegations of torture conducted by the State. 6 9 For
such an investigation to be effective, it "should be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible. '70 Just as the Court
held that Russia had failed to conduct an effective investigation into the
deaths of the deceased, the Court also found that Russia had failed to do so
with regards to the claims of torture. Therefore, the Court concluded that
Russia had violated Article 3 for failing to conduct an adequate investiga-
tion into the claims of torture.
7 1
positive obligation of Article 2 to effectively investigate deaths involving the use of force
by state authorities).
62. Khashiyev, supra note 1, 11 153.
63. See id. ' 158 ("In the absence of an attempt to establish any details of the mili-
tary unit which had been referred to by name, it is difficult to imagine how the investiga-
tion could be described as efficient.").
64. Id. 160, 163.
65. Id. 9 164.
66. Id. 166.
67. See id. Tl 19-20, 51, 54 (outlining witness testimony as to the condition of the
bodies and describing the cursory post-mortem examination conducted by medical
investigators); see id. 168 (describing plaintiffs' claim that there was an Article 3
violation).
68. See id. c19 172-74 (noting that although it was clear the plaintiffs' relatives had
been killed by military forces, it could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
they were tortured to death, and therefore Russia was not in direct violation of Article 3).
69. Id. 9 177.
70. Id.
71. Id. 179-80.
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Finally, the Court found Russia in violation of Article 1372 -right to
an effective remedy-for the same reasons that it held Russia in violation of
the positive obligations to conduct Article 2 and Article 3 investigations
into the deaths and alleged torture of the deceased. 73 For the combined
violations, the Court awarded non-pecuniary damages in the amount of
15,000 euros ($19,810) to Khashiyev, and 20,000 euros ($26,413) to
Akayeva as well as litigation costs for both plaintiffs.
7 4
Analysis
The Court's holding in Khashiyev comports with decisions involving
Turkish military operations against Kurdish separatists and claims of Arti-
cles 2, 3, and 13 violations. Most notably, the decision in Khashiyev is in
line with the rulings found in ;akici v. Turkey 75 and Timurta5 v. Turkey.
76
Those two cases marked the Court's emerging willingness to rely on cir-
cumstantial evidence to find governments in direct violation of the Conven-
tion for extrajudicial killings of civilians in their custody.7 7 The cases were
also characterized by factual scenarios in which government forces were
conducting military operations in civilian areas, and impunity for soldiers
who committed human rights abuses was pronounced.
78
From an evidentiary standpoint, Khashiyev is particularly analogous
to the circumstances in i~ek v. Turkey,79 in which the Court held that
missing Kurdish men allegedly detained by Turkish forces were presuma-
bly killed by security forces in an extrajudicial fashion.8 0 The Court in
i~ek based its conclusions on the consistent testimony of witnesses stat-
ing that the men were last seen alive in the control of Turkish forces, had
been missing for over six years, and the circumstances surrounding Turk-
72. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 2, art. 13 ("Everyone whose rights and
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
persons acting in an official capacity.").
73. Khashiyev, supra note 1, o [ 184-86.
74. Id. 9 199 (setting damages in euros to be converted to Russian roubles at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement). The conversion to dollars calculated at the rate
prevailing on the date of the judgment.
75. Cakici v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 583.
76. Timurta§ v. Turkey, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 303.
77. See Cakici, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. at 610 (finding that sufficient circumstantial
evidence existed to find Turkey had executed an individual it had taken into custody);
Timurta , 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 330-31 (finding that a missing Kurdish man had
been detained and presumed killed by Turkish forces based on witness testimony, dura-
tion of time the man had been missing, and the overall lawless environment of South-
eastern Turkey at the time of the killing). See also Gobind Singh Sethi, The European
Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence on Issues of Forced Disappearances, 8 HuM. RTs.
BIEF 29 (2001) (describing the treatment of disappearance cases by the Court and the
impact of ;akici, Timurta, and other cases on the Court's approach towards
disappearances).
78. See Timurta , 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., at 331 (recognizing the overall environment
of Southeastern Turkey at the time of military operations and how it fostered a "lack of
accountability of members of the security forces").
79. Ci~ek v. Turkey, App. No. 25704/94, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 464 (2003).
80. Id. at 495.
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ish operations against Kurdish separatists were marked by a general lack of
accountability for abuses committed by government soldiers.8 1 Like i~ek,
the rationale employed in Khashiyev indicates that the Court is still willing
to presume that an extrajudicial killing has occurred if sufficient witness
testimony affirms that the victim was last under the custody or control of
government forces, and a record of such abuses already exists.8 2 Given the
extent to which human rights groups have documented allegations of extra-
judicial detentions and killings by government forces in Chechnya,8 3 the
Khashiyev holding could be the first of many cases finding Russia in direct
violation of Article 2 of the Convention.
In addition to the liberal evidentiary threshold that the Court is seem-
ingly willing to use to presume direct violations of Article 2, Khashiyev also
indicates the Court's receptiveness to impose positive Article 2 and Article
3 obligations on Russia to conduct effective investigations of alleged
abuses. As the court holdings in Turkish cases suggest, this positive obliga-
tion is heightened when the government allegedly responsible for the viola-
tion is investigating itself, particularly during a military conflict.
84
Additionally, the Court's willingness to find violations for inadequate crim-
inal investigations comports with the Council of Europe's long standing
frustration with Russia for its failure to hold its forces accountable for
human rights violations in Chechnya, and the Republic's overall absence of
rule of law.8 5 Continued judgments against Russia might serve to under-
mine the government's credibility-both domestically and internationally-
with respect to its stance that it is fighting a legitimate and necessary war
against international terrorism.
81. See id. at 493, 495 (outlining circumstantial evidence that was sufficient to prove
that an extrajudicial killing had occurred).
82. Khashiyev, supra note 1, 11 142-47.
83. See INT'L HELSINKI FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [IHF], CHECHNYA: ENFORCED
"DISAPPEARANCES", EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS AND UNLAWFUL DETENTIONS - AN UPDATE
(2004), available at http://www.ihf-hr.org/viewbinary/viewdocument.php?docid =
6069; Human Rights Watch, Russia: Nine Civilians Extrajudicially Executed in Chechnya,
HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Apr. 13, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/12/russia
8424.htm; Press Release, Int'l Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, A Human Rights
Activist is Kidnapped, Tortured, and Murdered In Chechnya (Jan. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.ihf-hr.org/viewbinary/view html.php?doc id=5281.
84. See Timurta v. Turkey, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 303, 332-33 (finding Article 2
violation for failing to conduct an effective investigation of alleged death); Kaya v. Tur-
key, App No. 22729/93, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 46 (1998) (finding Article 2 violation for
failing to conduct effective investigation of death despite the "prevalence of violent
armed clashes [and] the high incidence of fatalities").
85. See Eur. Parl. Ass., The Political Situation in the Chechen Republic: Measures to
Increase Democratic Stability in Accordance with Council of Europe Standards, 2004
Sess., Res No. 1402, 1 1 Uuly 10, 2004) ("The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe reaffirms its commitment to further human rights, democracy and the rule of
law in the Chechen Republic - as an integral part of the Russian Federation - and
deplores the grave situation in which the people of Chechnya still have to live."); Eur.
Parl. Ass., The Human Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, 2003 Sess., Doc. No.
9732, § II, ' 3, (Mar. 13, 2003) (proposing creation of an international war crimes tribu-
nal to prosecute human rights abuses in Chechnya).
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With little political resolution to the conflict in Chechnya in sight, the
council of Europe's only recourse to address the Chechnya problem will
likely play out in the European Court of Human Rights. Similar to the
council's stance towards Turkey and that nation's poor human rights
record vis-a-vis its military operations against Kurdish separatists, the
council will likely continue to berate Russia for its own abuses but fail to
take any overt political action outside of the Court's legal judgments. The
European Court of Human Rights may thus serve as the only forum for
imputing responsibility for human rights violations in Chechnya. In this
sense, the ruling in Khashiyev is a victory for Chechen victims, and marks
the beginning of claims against Russia for Convention violations. In fact,
already over one hundred cases have been filed with the Court involving
abuses in Chechnya. 8 6 However, this is no compensation for the lives
already lost 8 7 in Europe's marginalized war.
86. See Strasbourg Court Sets Undesirable Precedent for Russia, RIA NovosTI (Mos-
cow), Mar. 3, 2005, available at http://www.lexis.com (follow "News & Business" hyper-
link; then follow "Country & Region" hyperlink; then follow "Europe" hyperlink; then
follow "News" hyperlink; then follow "European News Sources File" hyperlink; then
search for "Strasbourg Court Sets Undesirable Precedent for Russia"):
The European Court for Human Rights has already received more than 150
"Chechen cases", i.e. complaints from Russian citizens who suffered in military
operations during the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, writes Izvestia.
The European court upheld the first lawsuits last week, ruling that the Russian
side should pay about 170,000 euros to the plaintiffs. This sets a dangerous
precedent for Russia. Experts believe that subsequent lawsuits could inflict seri-
ous financial losses and tarnish Russia's image.
Id.; Nikki Tait, Court Condemns Russia over Chechnya Deaths, FIN. TIMES (Asia), Feb. 25,
2005, at 4.
Yesterday's decisions by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, in
claims brought by six Chechens who blamed the Russian government for deaths
of relatives, are likely to pave the way for other incidents involving alleged
human rights violations in the war-torn region to be heard by the court.
Lawyers say "well over" 100 cases, based around claims of abuse by the Russian
military during their crackdown on separatist rebels in the breakaway republic
of Chechnya, are currently stacked up in the Strasbourg court.
Id.
87. See Rajan Menon, Russia's Quagmire: On Ending the Standoff in Chechnya, BOSTON
REv., Summer 2004, at 26, available at http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.3/
menon.html (outlining estimates ranging from 34,000-180,000 deaths in Chechnya
since 1994).
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